

DISPUTES RESOLUTION AUTHORITY

Record No. 14/2005

Between:-

SÍLE NÍ BHRÍAIN
(rúnaí agus ionadaí ar son Cumann an Athar Uí Chathasaigh)

Claimant

-and-

SÉAMUS Ó HARTAIGÁIN
(mar ionadaí ar son Coiste Bórd Luimnigh CLG)

Respondent

DECISION

Background

1. The Claimant is a nominee of Cumann an Athar Uí Chathasaigh (“Fr. Casey’s”), which Club played Cumann Naomh Senáin (“St Senan’s”) in the Limerick Senior Football Championship Quarter-Final on 23 July 2005. This competition is organised by the Respondent (“the County Committee”).
2. During the course of that game (approximately 10 minutes into the second half), an incident is said to have occurred, which ultimately resulted in this Claim being brought.
3. While all representatives present at the hearing on behalf of Fr. Casey’s were present at the game and prepared to give evidence as to the incident in question, the County Committee did not have any witness present. Indeed, they chose not to put any replying evidence at all, stating essentially that the Claim should not succeed, irrespective of whether the facts alleged by Fr. Casey’s are proved or not.
4. A video recording of the game was offered by Fr. Casey’s, but for reasons which will be explained below, we ultimately have not examined it.

5. For the purpose of our decision, therefore, we will proceed on the basis that the statements of fact by Fr. Casey's are well-founded. However, we must emphasise that, making those assumptions, we are not making any criticism of the Referee concerned (who, it was agreed, was in fact one of the most able Referees in the County). The Tribunal has not seen the game, we are not qualified Referees, and it is only in default of a conflict of evidence that we are so proceeding.
6. The incident as described by Fr. Casey's went as follows. A ball was kicked by one Fr. Casey's player to another Fr. Casey's player, who was about 40 yards out from his own goal by the sideline when he caught the ball. As (or just after) he caught the ball, the Fr. Casey's player was fouled. The whistle blew and a free kick was ordered in favour of Fr. Casey's. Adopting Fr. Casey's' tactic for the game, the free-taker sought to take the free kick quickly, but considered that he was being obstructed by a St. Senan's player, as a result of which he pushed or in some way made contact with that St. Senan's player. Presumably deeming this to be retaliation, the Referee blew his whistle and took the ball to throw it in between the players (Playing Rule 5.20). At this point, another Fr Casey's player (the player who originally passed the ball at the beginning of this series of events) approached the Referee. Fr Casey's argue that he was neither abusive nor in dissent, but concede that he may have "*said something the Referee did not want to hear*".
7. In foot of whatever had been said to the Referee, the Referee decided to do two things: first, he awarded a free kick to St Senan's, and, secondly, he moved the ball forward by 13 metres in favour of St Senan's. The resulting free kick was not a difficult one and St. Senan's scored a point.
8. St Senan's won the game by a point (1-10 to 1-9). As we have said, the incident happened 10 minutes into the second half so it was not the last score and presumably much happened in the game after that point.

9. When asked whether it was possible that the Referee had first changed the throw-in to a free on the basis of abusive conduct (Playing Rule 5.5 (Football)) and then, on foot of further dissent, moved the ball forward 13 metres (Playing Rule 6.2 (Football)), Fr. Casey's were adamant that the whistle was blown once and that the two penalties were imposed as one transaction. This statement of fact must be accepted in default of any other evidence.
10. We asked then whether a Referee could in fact impose two penalties for the one offence (on the basis that what is dissent might often be abusive conduct also), and we accepted Fr. Casey's view that Playing Rule 6.2 (Football) expressly does not operate until a free kick has actually been awarded to the other team and that, consequently the free must be awarded to the other team before the sanction under Playing Rule 6.2 can be imposed.
11. Therefore, on the basis of the uncontested evidence, it does seem that the two penalties were imposed for the same playing offence.
12. That does not of course end the matter, but it is the primary allegation of fact on foot of which Fr Casey's' Claim is brought.
13. There is no explicit procedure in the Official Guide for objecting to the result of a game on the basis of an alleged refereeing error, a matter to which we will return later, but at any rate a Fr. Casey's sent a letter to the County Committee dated 25 July 2005 but received 28 July 2005, (which was called an "appeal" and met the formalities of an appeal under the Rules) seeking to have the result set aside and a replay ordered. The video evidence was proffered and the complaint (as summarised above) was set out.
14. The County Committee, citing Rule 1.1 of the Rules of Control, Official Guide 2003, Book 2, declined to deal with the matter at all and returned the letter of appeal by hand on 16 August 2005. No hearing took place. The game was duly awarded to St Senan's on foot of the Referee's report.

15. An appeal was lodged with Munster Council on 17 August 2005 but returned because, we are informed, the rule quoted was from the playing rules: by Rule 146(a), the rule alleged to have been infringed must be set out, and it seems – at least no strong challenge is made by Fr. Casey’s to the proposition – that such rule must be one from Book 1 of the Official Guide.
16. As a result of this, various events took place which culminated in the matter being brought to the D.R.A. by Claim dated 6 September 2005. This was outside the 7-day time limit, and the circumstances in which this occurred will be discussed immediately below, because an issue was raised on behalf of the County Committee arising from the failure to adhere to the time limit.

Time limit and exhaustion of appeals

17. It was argued by the County Committee that the failure to observe the 7-day time limit was fatal to the jurisdiction of this arbitral tribunal.
18. We will start with a brief comment about this time limit. The 7-day time limit, while at first blush draconian in the extreme (compare the six-year time limit for breach of contract and the three- and six-month time limits for judicial review), is essential to the management of competitions and functions of the Gaelic Athletic Association at all levels. Making fixtures in the modern era of Gaelic games is a difficult and complex process, and if legal or arbitral proceedings cannot expeditiously be dealt with, the prospect of massive disruption to a multitude of third parties will become a reality. In law, the equitable doctrine of *laches* or acquiescence, operates in a similar manner to defeat litigants who have not acted promptly. The power to extend the seven-day time limit ameliorates the apparent harshness of the time limit.
19. In this instance, Mr Keane, the Secretary of the D.R.A., informed the hearing that he had in fact extended time in reliance upon his powers under Rule 2.2 of the Disputes Resolution Code. In response to this, it was submitted that the failure to set out the reasons for such extension of time rendered the extension of time a nullity. At the hearing we decided, and ruled as a preliminary matter,

that this objection was not established. This is because there is no obligation on the Secretary to notify the Respondent of the reasons he might have for any extension of time he might allow. They must, of course be “*good reason*” as set out in Section 2.2, however that is a matter entirely within the discretion of the Secretary, and any injustice that might otherwise result from the failure to give reasons to the Respondent is cured by the right of appeal against any decision of the Secretary to the Tribunal (Section 12.2, Disputes Resolution Code), which is a *de novo* application for an extension of time.

20. Accepting that determination, the County Committee duly appealed the decision of the Secretary to extend time, and Fr Casey’s were asked to set out the circumstances which warranted an extension of time. They set out the background to the case, their efforts to ascertain the contact details for the Secretary (they had some difficulty and ultimately obtained the details from the Árd Stiúirthóir in Croke Park). They knew nothing about the rules or workings of the D.R.A. but wrote a lengthy letter on 25 August 2005 setting out the details of the case. Indeed, it might have been argued that letter this was itself a Claim duly filed, however the absence of a cheque in the amount of the deposit deprives the letter of this status.

21. We adjudicated on this issue at the hearing and we upheld the decision of the Secretary to extend time for the following reasons. The Arbitration rule is a new one, and is not yet printed in the Official Guide. That does not undermine its binding effect because the Rule Book is not printed immediately after each Congress (the rule will find itself printed in the next edition of the Rule Book, unless amended or repealed before that time) and Rule 80(g) brings the rule into force one month after the relevant Congress. However, the fact that the rule has not yet been printed into the Rule Book must inform our treatment of an application to extend the time for bringing this Claim. Evidence has been given of substantial efforts having been made to obtain particulars regarding the D.R.A.: contact details for the Secretary, the Disputes Resolution Code, the Claim Form and so on. These are reasons which might not be available in the future, but where there are genuine difficulties in obtaining the requisite details, to insist on the strictest compliance in all circumstances is unjust.

22. The case was not made by the County Committee that the invalidity of the appeal to Munster Council meant that the obligation to exhaust all available appeals was not met (part (iv) of the Arbitration rule enacted at Congress 2005). While it is not necessary therefore to go into this issue, we would like to make clear that the County Committee were correct not to make such a case. This is because (i) the reasons given above for extending time apply with similar force to the obligation to exhaust appeals, and (ii) since there is no stated procedure for making the complaint that Fr. Casey's did – in other words, since Fr. Casey's are seeking to establish a procedure that is new to the Association – the failure of an appeal on technical grounds suggests that there is in fact no “available” appeal unless and until the new procedure is established.

The claim in substance

23. Fr. Casey's accept that the Referee may make decisions that are factually incorrect. Thus, a free kick may be awarded where in fact a “dive” took place, and there is no redress. However, they argue that this was not a mere error of fact; rather, it was submitted, the action taken had no foundation whatever in rule, and this meant that the Referee had no jurisdiction to take that action: it is not within the powers or jurisdiction of the Referee to apply rules that do not correspond to the facts found by him.
24. This submission is based on the terms of Rule 1 (general) of the Rules of Control, which provides that “*Control of the Games shall be entrusted to a Referee, four Umpires and two Linesmen who shall decide on the field all matters affecting play.*” And also rule 1.2(i) of the Rules of Control which states under the heading “*Duties of the Referee*”, “*To control the game in accordance with the Playing Rules.*”
25. Fr. Casey's submit that the jurisdiction to award a game is vested in the Council or Committee in charge and not the Referee (Rule 107), and that this means that there is scope to refuse to award a game where events require it.

26. Because of the mistake they allege, Fr Casey's submit that the County Committee was entitled, and indeed bound, to declare the game to be a nullity. The failure of the County Committee to do so is said to be a breach of Rule 59 which provides that the County Games Administration Committee (an operative committee of the County Committee) "*shall be responsible for all arrangements, for control of, and any matters arising from games under the jurisdiction of the County Committee.*"
27. When questioned as to the extent to which a Referee's decision might be challenged by way of appeal or legal challenge, Fr Casey's conceded that not every mistake as to the application of rule could be justiciable. The example was given of a situation where the Referee accidentally interfered with play (ordinarily a throw-in results). What if, instead of throwing it in, he awarded a free to the team who were passing the ball at the time, and they won by 10 points? Obviously, it was accepted, this could not interrupt the result, even though it was a misapplication of rule, a similar "wrong" as is being alleged here.
28. The distinction was drawn by Fr. Casey's that in this Claim, unlike the example just given, the decision determined the outcome of the game. They accept, therefore, that there is a second element to be proved if they are to succeed. It might be noted at this point that Mr McMahon, Solicitor, for the County Committee did not accept that an opinion could be given by Fr. Casey's as to how the game might have turned out had the incident of which complaint is made not occurred, using words that the Tribunal suspects might not be his own:
- "This instant is thine; the next is in the womb of futurity, and thou knowest not what it may bring forth"*
29. Whatever about the circumstances of this case, if Fr. Casey's are correct in saying that the line is drawn between on the one hand, misapplications of rule which affect the outcome of a game, and on the other, those which do not, the question immediately arises as to *who* is charged with making the decision whether the outcome of the game has been affected or not? Fr. Casey's argue

that the County Committee should, and that if they (and the Provincial Council) refuse to do so, the Court or the D.R.A. can.

30. The County Committee submitted that Rule 2.1(i) of the Rules of Control, Official Guide 2003, Book 2, which provides that it is the duty of the Referee “*to control the game in accordance with the playing rules*” puts the matter outside their jurisdiction entirely. The Rules of Control provide likewise that “*Control of the Games shall be entrusted to a referee, four umpires and two linesmen, who shall decide on the field all matters affecting play*” and Rule 1.1 of the Rules of Control which provides that “*the Referee’s decision on any question of fact and in regard to time shall be final.*”
31. When put to the County Committee that some decisions of the Referee as to fact can indeed be reversed (e.g. misidentification of a player committing a playing offence), it was conceded that this can be the case but that these decisions could only be reversed insofar as they related to post-match suspensions. Thus if a player is sent off for a straight red card offence, where video evidence subsequently shows a “dive” by the supposed victim, the best that that player and his club can hope for is the removal of the suspension: the match will not ever be replayed, whatever the result.
32. The County Committee submitted that there was no rule which allowed them to refuse to award the game by amendment of the score line. While the award of a game is a function reserved unto the Council or Committee in charge (Rule 107), the award of a game follows the reported score line as night follows day. They submit that Rule 107 deals with situations such as, for example, where a team does not attend at a game: the rules provide for the award of the game to the team that did attend, but the Council or Committee in Charge make the award, not the Referee.
33. We put an extreme example to the County Committee: where a Referee might award a penalty kick for Team A when in fact the foul had been committed *by* Team A in their *own* square. The County Committee maintained that, while the decision would be perverse and unusual, there was no way they could refuse to

award the game as per the Referee's report. What, we asked, if it was shown that Team A had paid money to the Referee in advance of the game? Here, the County Committee accepted that something was wrong that deserved a remedy, but they could not say what that might be. The example, all agreed, was too unlikely. However the principle was acknowledged that there are extreme circumstances where the Council or Committee in Charge (or the Court/D.R.A.) might set a result of a game at nought based on Referee's conduct.

34. The County Committee submitted that only where there has been dishonesty or *mala fides* should a Referee's decision be overturned. That, it submitted, was not the case here.
35. When the matter was put to him, Mr Ahern, Chairman of Fr. Casey's made it clear that no allegation of *mala fides* was being made against the Referee in this case, but he reiterated that the consequences of the decision were so great as to trigger the entitlement and indeed the obligation to have the game replayed.

Video evidence before the D.R.A.

36. Rule 149 ("Evidence") provides at paragraph (c):

"The Committee or Council in Charge may have recourse to video evidence at its discretion, but it shall not be used in relation to the result of a game."

37. This is primarily applicable to disciplinary proceedings, and in that context it is clear. However it is argued on behalf of the County Committee that this prevents this Tribunal reviewing video evidence in an arbitral hearing challenging the result of a game. We do not believe that this is correct. While, as will be seen, the circumstances in which a Referee's decision can be overturned are narrow, if a serious allegation is made and evidence is available to a court, it will not consider itself bound by an internal rule of evidence of the organisation before it. The same applies for the D.R.A.

38. However, inasmuch as the Tribunal are asked to step into the shoes of a court of law, we also impose the limitations admission of evidence that the courts do. Thus, unless agreed by both parties, video evidence cannot be admitted unless it is proved (i.e. the cameraman must give evidence that he took the video recording and the County Committee are entitled to cross-examine him). This may seem harsh, but video evidence can also be unreliable, and the rules of evidence in the matter are clear. In this case, the County Committee (as they are entitled to do) called for proof of the video and as the cameraman was not present to give evidence, we have not examined the video evidence in this case.
39. It has to be said at this point, however, that the Tribunal would be reluctant, to say the least, to make judgment calls based on video evidence on the field of play, unless the matters contained in it were sufficiently clear that the parties were not in dispute about them. We are lawyers and administrators with perhaps a working knowledge of the Rules of the Association: this is a poor substitution for the training and experience of a Referee.

The issues

40. Traditionally, the courts have been reluctant to involve themselves in disputes involving sporting organisations. Sport is meant to be leisure, enjoyment and a distraction from the more serious aspects of life that are more likely to bring one onto contact with the courts. Over time, however, this reluctance abated somewhat, primarily where disciplinary proceedings against sportsmen and women were seen to be procedurally infirm. Litigation had already invaded the sports arena in other areas such as employment law, copyright, personal injuries and (not without great reservations) the criminal law, however the forays we speak of are interferences with the *governance* of sports.
41. A brief scan of the newspapers over the past few years reveals a noticeable increase in the number of legal challenges to governance by sports organisations, with allegations being made of failure to apply fair procedures, misinterpretation of rules, enforcing discipline in excess of jurisdiction and so on. The Gaelic Athletic Association has been no stranger to such challenges,

and the D.R.A. since its establishment has dealt with a number of high-profile as well as some perhaps less media-attractive disputes in this context. One of the fundamental grounds for the establishment of the D.R.A. was to give definitive written guidelines to the Association (because final and not interlocutory decisions are given). Here, in a case which has not attracted the public eye outside County Limerick, we have the opportunity to deal with an issue of fundamental importance to sports governance generally, and in particular to the Gaelic Athletic Association: when, if ever, can the law review sports governance at its very heart, the field of play?

42. The Referee in Gaelic Games is conferred with both the power and the obligation to control games. It is not obligatory under the Rules that a Referee must have any stated qualifications, but there is evidence in abundance in Book 1 of the Rules of the Association that the appointment, training and instruction of Referees is of great importance to the Association, and it is common case that Referees will in fact have undergone practical instruction in the rules of the games. From the foregoing, it is quite apparent that the Referee is expected to have knowledge and ability greater than that of the ordinary spectator.
43. Against this background, Book 2 of the Rules of the Association (Rules of Control) lists certain powers that are given to the Referee. In particular, as has been set out above, the Referee's decision on any matter of fact is deemed to be final. The rationale for such a rule is patent: finality is not merely desirable, it is of the essence. Appeals against decisions made on the field of play – particularly in the day of videotape/DVD – may reduce the number of errors, but the price of such increased accuracy is delay, discontinuity of play and erosion of the authority of officials. This is not to say that on-the-field appeals (or similar systems such as the video referee in Rugby Union) could not be provided for, but that is not the case under the Association's rules and the reasons are wholly understandable.
44. A notable exception to this general rule arises in the case of disciplinary proceedings occurring after the game in question. Thus, for example, where misidentification of a player results in a sending-off and suspension, that

penalty can be set aside on review by the Council or Committee in Charge. Video evidence will often be used in support of the player's case and Rule 149 (quoted above) expressly permits this, subject to the qualification that it cannot be used to question scores or the result of a game. How does this square with Rule 1 of the Rules of Control? The answer lies in the fact that, when the game is over, the compelling need for an instant final determination is not present: the result cannot be changed, but the ill-effect of an incorrect decision can be discontinued (most commonly by removing a suspension).

45. Inasmuch as the Council or Committee in Charge cannot overrule a Referee's finding as to a fact, still less can a court of law or arbitral tribunal enter the fray and wear the cloth of expertise which belongs to the Referee alone. An illustration of this principle may be found in the decision of the Court of Arbitration for Sport decision in Segura v IAAF (CAS OG 00/013) where a referee's decision that an athlete competing in a walking race had "lifted" (or "ran" for the less well-informed of us) was challenged. The CAS held that:

"CAS arbitrators do not review the determinations made on the playing field by judges, referees, umpires or other officials who are charged with applying what is sometimes called "rules of the game"... If they happen to have been present at the relevant event, CAS arbitrators were merely spectators with no official role. Moreover, they are not, unlike on-field judges, selected for their expertise in officiating the particular sport..."

46. As our discussion with the parties in submissions bore out, that there are at last some, admittedly rare and exceptional, instances, where, notwithstanding a rule that a Referee's or umpire's decision is final, both an organising committee and, if necessary, a court or arbitral tribunal, could actually reverse or annul a Referee's determination of fact on the field of play.
47. This in fact reflects the law as it has developed. For an eloquent description of class of decision to which we refer, we would again refer to a decision of the Court of Arbitration for Sport in Korean Olympic Council v International Skating Union (CAS OG 01/007), where it was stated that:

"The jurisprudence of the CAS in regard to the issue raised by this application is clear, although the language used to explain that

jurisprudence is not always consistent and can be confusing. Thus, different phrases, such as “arbitrary”, “bad faith”, “breach of duty”, “malicious intent”, “committed a wrong” and “other actionable wrongs” are used, apparently interchangeably, to express the same test....

In the Panel’s view, each of those phrases means more than that the decision is wrong or one that no sensible person could have reached. If it were otherwise, every field of play decision would be open to review on its merits. Before a CAS Panel will review a field of play decision, there must be evidence, which generally must be direct evidence, of bad faith. If viewed in this light, each of those phrases means that there must be some evidence of preference for, or prejudice against, a particular team or individual. The best example of such preference or prejudice was referred to by the Panel in Segura, where they stated that one circumstance where a CAS Panel could review a field of play decision would be if a decision were made in bad faith, eg. as a consequence of corruption (See Para, 17). The Panel accepts that this places a high hurdle that must be cleared by any Applicant seeking to review a field of play decision. However, if the hurdle were to be lower, the flood-gates would be opened and any dissatisfied participant would be able to seek the review of a field of play decision.”

48. In the absence of any reported judgment concerning decisions as to control of games, either in this jurisdiction or in England, we respectfully adopt the assessment of the C.A.S. on this issue: on first principles it is unimpeachable.
49. The above case does not directly deal with the distinction drawn by Fr. Casey’s between factual errors and situations where the facts are undisputed but the rule applied to the facts is wrong. That is what Fr. Casey’s argue happened here.
50. In our view, however, the grounds we have set out above (finality, certainty etc.), on which is based the principle that Referees’ decisions as to facts are final, applies equally to Referees’ decisions regarding the application of the rules to the facts. It is just as important that there is certainty and finality as to the application of rules as there is to decisions as to fact. The Referee is usually the most expert person on the field of play (and indeed in the park) in matters relating to the Playing Rules. Not only is he entrusted with the power to decide matters of fact, such as whether a particular transaction is fair or foul, but also to decide the manner in which the rules are to be applied to the factual transaction that has occurred. It is of course the case that Referees carry the *duty* to control

games in accordance with the rules (Rules of Control 1.2(i)); however they are also entrusted with the *right* to control games (Rules of Control 1 and 1.1(i)).

51. In essence, there must be a supreme decision-maker as to the facts and also as to the application of the facts. On the field of play, the Referee is that supreme decision-maker. Just as there is not (under current rule) an appeal from the decision-maker on the field, the decisions (insofar as they affect the score and the result) cannot either be appealed thereafter before the Council or Committee in charge.
52. It is certainly the case that an error (whether of fact or of application of rule) might change the outcome of a game, and as a result, injustice will occur. If Fr. Casey's are correct that there was a mistake in this case and that it changed the outcome of the game, then one must have sympathy for them. However, even if they are right on both of these issues, this cannot allow for an erosion of the principle of Referees' control. How an error at any particular stage in a game will affect the outcome is something of an imponderable, and the fact that injustice will occasionally result from a blanket protection of Referees' decisions is a consequence that must be borne by all¹. It is the lesser evil.
53. There is one exception that must, however, be provided for and that is where there has been bad faith. If a Referee is shown to have had an improper motive amounting to a corruption of his role as an impartial arbiter of fact and rule, then his decisions may be opened to scrutiny. Whether such decisions are as to matters of application of rule or of fact is not material if there is corruption: both are tainted and may be examined. Indeed, proven corruption might well taint the game even though no evidence is available of any particular instance of a perverse decision having been made.

¹ A stark example may be found in the C.A.S. decision in *Yang Tae Young v/FIG* (CAS 2004/A/704), concerning the men's all-round gymnastics event at the Athens Olympics, where an arithmetical error by the judges resulted in an error which was greater than the final difference between the score of the Claimant (who got bronze) and the winner. The CAS refused to overturn the judges' decision.

54. We do not wish to enumerate what might or might not be bad faith or corruption in any given case, as cases may well arise in the future where that issue is more fully argued.
55. While there is no express procedure for dealing with cases of bad faith or corruption (presumably because such cases rarely if ever occur), in our view, it is implied that such extraordinary wrongdoing does warrant the use by the Council or Committee in charge of, if nothing else, an *ad hoc* procedure to overturn the award of a game. Rule 149 may well make such a procedure difficult to carry out, because it prevents video evidence from being used in relation to the result of a game, irrespective of the nature of the wrongdoing alleged. We are not deciding that question one way or another, but as a general principle, we believe that if corruption were shown, both the Council/Committee in charge and the Courts/D.R.A. would be entitled to intervene to redress the wrong (in the case of the latter, video evidence could undoubtedly be used).
56. These are not matters we have to decide in this case because no allegation of bad faith or corruption is made.
57. Before leaving the question, however, we should clarify that there may be cases where corruption is shown but that, for different reasons (e.g. the competition in question having advanced by several rounds since the game in question), it would be inequitable to undo the result all that has happened thereafter.

Conclusion

58. For the reasons set out above, we are of the opinion and make our award as follows:
 - (a) Where no corruption or bad faith is shown or alleged, a Referee's decision on the field of play, whether as to primary fact or as to the application of rule, and whether right or wrong, may not be overturned by the Council or

Committee in charge or, in a legal challenge, by the D.R.A., in a manner which affects the outcome of the game²;

(b) The Claim is therefore refused.

59. Finally, we wish to thank the representatives of both parties who conducted this hearing on a matter of fundamental importance to the Association in an able and professional manner.

Dated the 21st of September 2005

Edward Hogan

John Callinan, Solicitor

Micheál O'Connell BL (Chairman)

² This should not be taken to govern situations where teams agree to replay a game for one reason or another. The matter has not been argued, but there are situations where a genuine error by a Referee is of such import that the teams – in the spirit of sportsmanship – might agree a replay. We assume (without ruling on the question) that this can be facilitated by Committees in charge.

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